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Americans and Englishmen, wags remind us, are divided by a
common language. Something similar (if less amusing) might be said
about constitutional scholars in law schools, history departments, and
political science departments. We all seem to be speaking the same
language-the language of American constitutionalism-but each
department speaks that language with a distinctly disciplinarian dialect.
Rarely do scholars in each discipline fully and fairly engage those in other
departments.
Today, the editors of the Syracuse Law Review are doing their part to
bridge these disciplinary gaps, by bringing together a remarkable collection
of constitutional scholars from law, history, and political science. I am
deeply grateful to the editors for their sponsorship of this important
contribution to constitutional conversation. And I am also deeply grateful
to the individual contributors to this book symposium for their sympathetic
engagement with my own attempt in America's Constitution: A Biography
to write something that might be of interest to all three disciplines.
Now is not the proper time, nor is this the proper place, for me to
attempt to respond to every (or indeed, to any) symposium essay in
elaborate detail, point for point. Ideally, authors should thank reviewers,
not quarrel with them, and I hereby thank each of my colleagues for his
generous words and constructive engagement with my project. While I am
saddened that my words of thanks cannot be directly expressed to the late
President Kermit Hall, I am especially grateful to his family and friends,
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who have helped to ensure that some of his final thoughts on the
Constitution have been preserved for posterity.
My remarks today unfold in three parts. In Part I, I present a general
overview of my next book, tentatively entitled America's Unwritten
Constitution: Between the Lines and Beyond the Text, which I hope to
complete next year for publication in 2009. In Part II, I offer a more
detailed outline of one chapter of this book-in-progress. There is a key
caveat: Both Parts I and II are highly tentative. I expect to do an enormous
amount of rethinking as I finish my research and complete the actual
writing of this book. (At this point, only the first chapter has been written.)
But in the spirit of interdisciplinary constitutional conversation-the spirit
animating today's symposium-I offer these sneak previews in the hope
that they might prompt reactions and elicit suggestions from readers in all
three fields. In my concluding Part III, I try to draw a few quick
connections between my current work-in-progress, and the themes that
have characterized the bodies of work of my colleagues in today's
symposium.
I. A TENTATNE OVERVIEW OF AMERICA'S UNWRIITEN CONSTITUTION
In America's Constitution: A Biography, I took readers on a walking
tour of the written Constitution, from its first words to its last clause. In my
envisioned sequel, America's Unwritten Constitution: Between the Lines
and Beyond the Text, I will invite readers to join me in exploring parts of
America's constitutional system that cannot quite be found in-and that
may even exist in tension with-the explicit words of the written
Constitution.!
The concept of an "unwritten" American Constitution actually
1. The concluding passage of the postscript of America's Constitution: A Biography
highlighted the need for:
at least one more book to start where this one ends, giving readers a detailed
account of America's unwritten Constitution. Such a book could canvass
Supreme Court case law; could assess quasi-constitutional framework statutes that
have emerged and endured in America; could ponder other foundational American
legal texts such as the Declaration of Independence and the Northwest Ordinance;
could examine unwritten customs of Americans worthy of constitutional
protection; could systematically consider other modem constitutions across the
globe for the wisdom doubtless embedded in many of these documents/traditions;
could reflect on the teachings of past and present political philosophers; and could
assess particularly plausible proposals for new constitutional amendments. In
other words, such a future book could profitably take the interested reader in any
number of directions that today's narrative has not.
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 477 (2005). My proposed
sequel is designed to redeem the promissory note of this passage.
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involves several different, intertwined ideas. Over the course of twelve
chapters, I shall trace twelve distinct strands of unwritten constitutionalism
and in the process say some things that (I hope) are fresh and accessible-
fresh even to constitutional law experts and accessible to general readers.
A one-page preface will introduce the project. I have in mind
something like this:
America prides herself on a written Constitution that lays down the
supreme law of the land. The scope and limits of federal authority; the
division of labor between the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches; the powers and duties of state governments; the privileges and
immunities of citizens; the rights of aliens-all these are covered in a
single and remarkably concise multigenerational document distilling
enduring lessons of the national experience from the Founding to the
present.
Yet there is far more to American constitutionalism than the several
thousand words that form the document itself. Alongside America's
written Constitution lies a vast unwritten Constitution, whose
interpretation requires us to range beyond the terse text. But once we
venture outside the written Constitution's confines, where and how
should we start? When and why should we stop? What rules, if any,
should guide our reading of America's unwritten Constitution?2 How
can unwritten constitutionalism be squared with fidelity to the written
text?
This book tackles these questions. I aim to take readers on a trip well
beyond America's written Constitution, but along paths that nonetheless
connect up in one way or another to the canonical text itself. For
example, the written Constitution's Ninth Amendment refers to
"rights ... retained by the people" that are not strictly "enumerate[ed]"
within the four corners of the constitutional document itself.3 To take
this patch of constitutional text seriously, Americans must go beneath
and beyond the Constitution's textually enumerated rights. But unless
we want our unwritten Constitution to swallow up our written one and
become all things to all people, we should proceed in a disciplined
fashion and with considerable care, as I hope to explain and illustrate.
2. A quick clarification to forestall confusion: Much (though not all) of the "unwritten
Constitution" explored in this book does involve written materials-for example, Supreme
Court opinions, landmark congressional statutes, state constitutions, and classic expressions
of American ideals such as the Gettysburg Address. These materials, while surely written
texts, are nonetheless distinct from the written Constitution and are thus properly described
as parts of America's unwritten Constitution.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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The Ninth Amendment is hardly the only constitutional portal bidding
us to journey beyond the Constitution's text, and the trail of
unenumerated rights is only one of several routes worth traveling in
search of America's unwritten Constitution. In the pages that follow, I
invite readers to revisit many of our Constitution's most important
topics, from federalism, congressional practice, executive power, and
judicial review to race relations, women's rights, popular
constitutionalism, criminal procedure, voting rights, and the amendment
process. In my closing chapter, I conclude with some thoughts about
whether foreign law sources have a proper role in the American
constitutional conversation and with some suggestions about how
America's Constitution-both written and unwritten-might serve as a
model for desperately needed reforms of the current world order.
Chapter One will excavate America's Implicit Constitution. This
approach to America's unwritten Constitution digs beneath the written
Constitution's explicit rules to discover their underlying premises and
entailments. For example, the written Constitution explicitly says that the
Vice President presides over the Senate. It also explicitly says that the
Senate sits as the nation's court of impeachment. So does this mean that
the Vice President may preside at his own impeachment trial? Heaven
forbid! But where does the Constitution bar such blatant self-dealing? I
will show how one particular impeachment clause-which says nothing
explicit about the Vice President-may properly be read to mean rather
more than it says and to implicitly bar Vice Presidential self-dealing. I
shall then canvas an assortment of other case studies and hypotheticals to
illustrate how faithful constitutional interpreters must at times read between
the lines.
Chapter Two will introduce readers to America's enacted
Constitution. The Founders' "Constitution" was not merely a document,
but a deed, not just a text, but an action-an enactment, an ordainment, an
establishment. Proper interpretation of this Constitution requires attention
to what was done by the deed, as well as what was said by the text. For
example, the process of constitutional ordainment featured uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open political speech and press, free from any notable
censorship by governmental officials or agencies, even though much of the
vigorous expression constituted a sharp rebuke to the existing authorities.
Even before the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the ordainment process
itself thus gave legal validity to a robust right of political criticism and
political expression, without which the Constitution would never have
come into existence, and the people's vaunted right to alter or abolish
government would have become a grim joke rather than a ·genuine legal
reality.
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There is yet another aspect of the enacted Constitution: the act of
establishing the Constitution at the Founding did not really end with the
ratification of the document by state conventions as provided for in the
document's Article VII. As a practical matter, the written Constitution's
words needed to be made flesh-especially the rather open-ended words
summoning into existence a new-fangled "President." To do justice to the
written Constitution, we must go beyond its explicit text-first, by taking
note of its unwritten, between-the-lines delegation of power to George
Washington in Article II, and second, by paying special heed to how
Washington in fact perfonned (that is, how he enacted, as a thespian might
enact a script) the textually open-ended Presidency. Certain basic features
of America's constitutional system were established less by the
Constitution's text than by President Washington's actions, which he
undertook with scrupulous constitutional consciousness and with the
acquiescence of the other branches of government and the American people
themselves.
Just as the paper Constitution was actually embodied and fleshed-out
during the Washington administration, so too, the paper Reconstruction
Amendments were made flesh by a series of landmark Civil Rights Acts
passed by Congress in the late l860s and 1870s. These statutes, too,
deserve to be understood as foundational aspects of America's unwritten
Constitution. Whereas the Philadelphia framers, led by presiding officer
George Washington, drafted the language of Article II in a way that
effectively delegated broad power to shape the Presidency to the first
President (who of course would be Washington himself), so the
Reconstruction Congress drafted the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments in a manner that gave itself broad authority to shape the full
meaning of these amendments. Yet the Supreme Court has not always seen
the matter this way, and has repeatedly failed to give canonical status to
these landmark Reconstruction enactments.
Chapter Three will discuss America's Unenumerated Rights. The
famously cryptic Ninth Amendment proclaims, in its entirety, that "[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." What exactly are these
"other rights"? Where are they to be found, and how, if at all, are they to
be enforced by courts? What are we to make of the words "the people" in
this Amendment? Next, consider the Fourteenth Amendment, which
proclaims that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens.,,4 Alas, the Amendment
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
HeinOnline -- 57 Syracuse L. Rev. 272 2006-2007
272 Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 57:267
does not expressly enumerate these fundamental, non-abridgeable
privileges and immunities, or explicitly specify where they are to be found.
Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment say in so many words that these
unspecified privileges and immunities should be protected against the
federal government as well as against the states. How should faithful
interpreters read this key Reconstruction provision? Which branch or
branches of government should take the lead in defining fundamental
rights? Where should these governmental officials look for guidance?
These are among the most difficult and contentious questions in
modem constitutional theory. In this chapter, I shall offer my own
answers, elaborating and illustrating several overlapping ways in which the
Ninth Amendment's vision of unenumerated rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment's promise of privileges and immunities might sensibly be
interpreted and enforced. I will also analyze whether certain narrow but
unenumerated limitations on rights may also exist. For instance, military
courts-martial do not provide regular jury trials, and there is no explicit
exception for such courts in the Constitution's general promise ofjury trials
for criminal defendants. Nevertheless, the Constitution has in practice been
read to exempt such courts from the jury trial right.
Chapter Four will explore America's Governmental Constitution.
England has never had a single written document comprehensively setting
out the nation's basic ground rules, yet it was commonplace at the
Founding to refer to the "English Constitution" to describe the overall
English system of government. America, too, has a system of government,
and that system, as it actually operates, sometimes does so in ways
nowhere set forth in-and even in tension with-the actual written text of
the Constitution.
Chapter Five will analyze America's Doctrinal Constitution-the
sprawling mass of judicial opinions proclaiming do's and don'ts in the
name of the Constitution (and thus insulating the resulting judicial decrees
from ordinary legislative override). Some of the most famous instances of
modem constitutional case law have involved judicial enforcement of the
core meaning of various provisions of the written Constitution. Such cases
are relatively easy to justify. Far more problematic is that some things that
courts have done in the name of the Constitution seem flatly inconsistent
with what the written Constitution itself says and was understood to mean
when it was adopted. In such cases, judges are not coloring within the
written Constitution's lines so much as they are painting their own
pattem-drawing their own conclusions, so to speak-with no real
guidance from or link to the written Constitution. This 'chapter will identify
and analyze some of the most significant and controversial areas where the
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doctrine has arguably strayed far from the document itself. It will also try
to address the $64,000 doctrinal question: If a judicial case or a line of
judicial cases is ultimately deemed to be out of sync with the basic outlines
of the Constitution itself, rightly read, to what extent should judges
nevertheless follow this case or this line out of respect for precedent?
Chapter Six will introduce and elaborate on the notion of America's
Lived Constitution. Many Americans' most basic rights are simply facts of
life, the residue of a virtually unchallenged pattern and practice in domains
where citizens act freely and governments lie low. As noted in Chapter
Three, the Ninth Amendment speaks of rights "retained by the people"s and
the Fourteenth Amendment promises respect for the fundamental
"privileges [and] immunities of citizens.,,6 Both these open-ended
provisions can be read to direct constitutionally scrupulous government
officials to tread with special care when entering domains that, as a matter
of general practice, have been free from governmental intrusion.
Chapter Seven will explore America's Symbolic Constitution. In a
polyglot nation of many faiths, languages, ethnicities, and opinions, the
Constitution stands as a unifying icon, a republican version of England's
Queen Elizabeth. But the written Constitution is not the only text that has
achieved an especially exalted status as a basic statement of what it means
to be an American. We thus should take a close look at a handful of other
iconic American texts that have, at one point or another, been informally
ratified in the hearts and minds of Arnericans--even Americans who may
never have actually read these texts (just as many have not read the written
Constitution). The following five documents are illustrative, albeit not
exhaustive, of America's symbolic constitution: the Declaration of
Independence, the Northwest Ordinance, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address,
the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, and Dr.
King's "I Have a Dream" speech.
Several large symbols of national identity are negative symbols,
crystallizing what America today rejects-indeed, abhors. This chapter
will present five negative symbols to accompany the five above-mentioned
positive icons. To begin with, three Supreme Court opinions occupy the
lowest level of Hell: Dred Scott v. Sandford,7 Plessy v. Ferguson,8 and
Lochner v. New York. 9 Each case presents an example of unwritten
constitutionalism run amok, and thus powerfully reminds us of the need to
5. U.S. CONST. amend IX.
6. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
7. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
8. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
9. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
HeinOnline -- 57 Syracuse L. Rev. 274 2006-2007
274 Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 57:267
place some principled limits on judges who venture beyond the words and
enactment history of the written Constitution. Of course, the Supreme
Court is hardly the only entity to have generated powerful negative
symbols; so have Congress and the Executive Branch. No one branch has a
monopoly of constitutional vice or virtue. Therefore, just as this chapter
will examine iconic positive symbols from a wide range of sources, so too,
it will examine negative symbols from all federal branches. From the
Congress it will examine the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. From the
Presidency it will examine Nixon's Watergate mentality that he stood
above the law by definition. ("When the President does it, that means it is
not illegal.")
Chapter Eight will ponder America's Feminist Constitution. The
written Constitution explicitly describes itself as ordained by "the People"
and also explicitly proclaims itself "the supreme law," superior to ordinary
congressional statutes. These two explicit texts were implicitly linked by
an overarching political theory of legitimacy, based on principles of
popular sovereignty: the Constitution of 1787-88 should trump an ordinary
statute enacted later because a mere statute passed by the Congress was not
on the same democratic level as a Constitution ratified more directly and
democratically (albeit earlier) by "the People themselves" in a process that
allowed an unusually wide slice of Americans to vote (by the standards of
1787). But then something happened in America that the Founders did not
fully anticipate, and whose transcendent implications for American
Constitutionalism were not fully understood even when it happened:
women got the vote via the Nineteenth Amendment. Almost overnight, the
proportion of eligible voters doubled in the most dramatic extension of the
franchise in all of American history. And this event profoundly
complicated the standard democratic story for why the Constitution should
trump a later statute.
To see why, suppose that Congress tomorrow were to enact a new
civil rights law designed to protect women's rights. Suppose further that
this new civil rights law is thought by some to go beyond the powers given
to Congress by the Founding text, and even to go beyond the powers given
to Congress by the Reconstruction Amendments. If we allow the old
Constitution to trump the new statute, in what sense can this trumping be
said to be democratic and consistent with popular sovereignty? "The
People" who voted for the Founding text and who voted for the
Reconstruction Amendments did not generally include women voters, but
the Congress that passed our hypothetical modem civil rights laws was
voted for by women. Indeed, women themselves-lots of them-serve in
modem Congresses but never served in the constitutional ratifying
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conventions of the 1780s or the legislatures who approved the
Reconstruction Amendments in the 1860s.
Thus, if we are to vindicate the written Constitution's deepest
legitimating principle-popular sovereignty-we should embrace the
following as a basic precept of America's unwritten Constitution:
congressional laws enacted after the Nineteenth Amendment and designed
to protect women's rights should be entitled to a special measure of respect
because of their special democratic pedigree. True, the various pre-1920
constitutional enactments and amendments were enormously democratic
for their times. Yet when they are instead viewed retrospectively through
.the lens of the Nineteenth Amendment, they suffer from a notable
democracy deficit. Nor can the problem be wished away by blithe
assertions that earlier generations of men "virtually represented" women,
because at the very heart ofthe adoption ofthe Nineteenth Amendment was
a repudiation of this particular version of virtual representation ofwomen
hymen.
Chapter Nine introduces the idea of America's Conscientious
Constitution. Enacted and amended by a collective (and often capitalized)
People, the Constitution needs to be enforced by individual persons
wielding official powers. The Presidency is the document's most personal
office, revolving, as it does, around one lonely figure vested with all
executive power. But judges and jurors are persons, too. Often, one hopes,
they are persons of conscience. The written Constitution envisions the
individual conscience of the government officer as a powerful force in the
law; hence, the multiple references to "oaths" in the written document.
As a general matter, perhaps persons interpreting the Constitution may
properly consult their conscience as a tie-breaker if the legal materials are a
toss-up. And in one particular domain-the domain of criminal
punishment and criminal sentencing-the written Constitution was in fact
structured so as to give even wider room to the consciences of the
individuals personally responsible for inflicting pain or even death on
fellow creatures, with the rules generally structured to privilege the
conscience or consciences inclined towards mercy. The precise occasions
for mercy are not, and probably cannot be, exhaustively codified in a
written Constitution. Hence, the written Constitution structures decisional
space for uncodifiable conscience. Alas, much of this structure today lies
in disrepair.
Chapter Ten will canvass America's State Constitutions. Fifty state
constitutions buttress their federal counterpart. Without these state
buttresses, the entire federal constitutional edifice would collapse. State
constitutional voting provisions, for example, define voting eligibility for
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both House and Senate races. State legislatures determine how state
presidential electors will be chosen. State judiciaries sit as trial courts in
the great run of cases ultimately subject to final resolution in federal
tribunals. And so on.
Chapter Eleven addresses the topic of America's Unfinished
Constitution. One aspect of an unwritten Constitution is the Constitution
still-to-be-written, the hoped-for Constitution of, say, 2050. Careful study
of our existing Constitution and its history can also help us to identify areas
where· dramatic changes can occur even without formal textual
amendments. For example, we have seen revolutionary changes in the
treatment of gender discrimination, even in the absence of a formal Equal
Rights Act. IO So too, the manner of selecting presidents has shifted
radically without any formal amendment; today it is virtually unthinkable
that a state legislature would pick presidential electors itself with no regard
to the views of the voters. Yet as late as 1812, this was indeed a relatively
common practice. Similarly, many states in effect moved to the direct
election of Senators before the Seventeenth Amendment codified and
constitutionalized the new regime.
With these lessons in mind, it may be useful to see how, for example,
America in the early twenty-first century might move towards direct
national election of the President, even without a formal Article V
amendment. In this chapter, I will show how direct national election could
indeed be accomplished by the coordinated actions of less than a dozen
large-state legislatures. II I will also show how direct national election
could be achieved through a "gentlemen's agreement" between the two
10. See discussion of Chapt. 8 supra.
11. This section will build on a short op-ed I published on a legal website in December,
2001. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, How to Achieve Direct National
Election of the President Without Amending the Constitution, FINoLAW, Dec. 28, 2001,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20011228.htrnl. Here is the opening passage: "Imagine
this: Americans could pick the President by direct national election, in 2004 and beyond,
without formally amending our Constitution. A small number of key states--eleven, to be
precise-would suffice to put a direct election system into effect." Id. In essence, I suggest
that a group of states, through coordinated legislation and/or an interstate compact, could
decide to give all of their electoral votes to the national popular vote winner, regardless of
the electoral returns within each state (or the group of states as a whole). See id. These
state laws would go into effect only when the group of coordinating/compacting states
included enough states to control a majority of the electoral college (270 votes), thus
guaranteeing that the national popular vote winner would also win the electoral college.
In late August 2006, the California legislature actually adopted a version of this plan, which,
alas, was vetoed by Governor Schwarzenegger on September 30. If California were to
readopt this proposal, perhaps by statewide initiative, and if ten other big states were to
follow suit, then the national vote count would determine the presidential election.
1"
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major parties' presidential candidates and their two running mates. 12
This chapter will also describe how various institutions and voters
who currently have the ability to block constitutional amendments that
would reduce their own powers might nonetheless be induced to endorse
these amendments if these institutions and voters were convinced of the
genuine justice of such amendments in principle. So, for example, why
would voters or legislators in Wyoming ever vote to reduce the Senate's
malapportionment given that the existing (if unjust) constitutional rules
favor Wyoming? Why would Wyoming's U.S. Senators ever sign their
own electoral death warrants? Why would Congressmen ever support an
amendment to limit congressional terms? And so on. The key concept I
will introduce is the idea of a time-delay between the vote and the start
date. We are accustomed to laws that automatically lapse-that "sunset"-
after a certain time period. Here I highlight the category of rules that go
into effect-that "sunrise"--only after a considerable time delay.
The concluding (twelfth) chapter will invite readers to imagine a new
form of World Constitutionalism, American-style. It will begin by
considering what role, if any, foreign law and norms should play in
construing the American Constitution. It will conclude by discussing how
America's Constitution, written and unwritten, might serve as a model for
the world. America's Constitution was originally designed, of course, as a
kind of World Constitution-a Constitution, that is, for the New World,
separated by vast oceans from the Old World. But at the dawn of a new
millennium, it is clear that Planet Earth is one world, and that global
solutions are needed to solve genuinely global problems-the warming of
the Earth at an alarming rate, overpopulation, mass starvation and
genocide, international terrorism, free and fair trade, and on and on.
Many of the existing world institutions are inadequate-in ways that
call to mind the similar inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation in
addressing the problems of the New World in the 1780s. The United States
in 1785 looked rather like the United Nations today, whose General
Assembly bears an uncanny resemblance to the Confederation Congress:
one-state, one-vote in a body that declares a lot and does much less, where
member states sometimes obey and sometimes do not.
The solution of the Framers was to create a strong community ofNew
World democracies. In today's world, there is not a true international
counterpart of any real importance. The U.N.-in both the General
Assembly and Security Council-seats thuggish regimes alongside
admirable ones. NATO is focused overwhelmingly on military issues and
12. Amar, supra note 11.
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excludes non-European nations. The E.U. is likewise just a regional body.
The GATT and G7/8 feature the world's economic powerhouses, whether
or not they are democratic. OPEC is only for the oil-rich, the Arab League
for Arabs, and so on. What is needed is a new international group that
would start out quite informally and gradually gain legitimacy and informal
authority as a powerful moral force in the world-a genuinely international
community of democracies combining rich states and poor ones, North and
South, East and West. It would include the U.S., of course, but also India,
Mexico, Old Europe, and New Europe--only the truly democratic
countries in Europe or elsewhere. This, in effect, would be the
internationalization of the "sleeping giant" of the American Constitution,
the republican government clause requiring individual states in the Union
to meet minimum standards of democratic decency-free speech, fair
votes, respect for minorities, and so on.
II. A SNEAK PREVIEW OF CHAPTER 10: AMERICA'S STATE CONSTITUTIONS
When state constitutional systems are examined, a striking pattern
emerges: across a large number of large issues, virtually all state
constitutions have converged on a single distinct model of government.
When it comes to at least ten fundamental constitutional features, virtually
every state for the last half century has resembled every other state and the
federal model, too. As to these features, there is a distinctly American way,
with elements that differ dramatically from those on display in at least one
prominent non-American constitution either currently in operation or of
recent vintage. Here, then, are ten basic features of American
constitutionalism:
• First, a written Constitution adopted and amendable by some
expression of popular sovereignty above and beyond enactment
by an ordinary legislative majority. (Compare this with
England and Israel, although note that both countries may be
moving closer to the American model.)
• Second, a Bill of Rights textually separate from the rest of the
document. The fifty-one American Bills of Rights also overlap
a great deal in their language and substantive coverage,
generally including, for example, freedom of speech, press,
religion, and arms bearing; protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures; procedural guarantees of rights of
criminal defendants; and safeguards of jury trial. (Compare
this with England, which, for almost all of the twentieth
century, has no entrenched Bill of Rights. Note that here, too,
England may be moving closer to the American model in
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recent years.)
• Third, a bicameral legislature (except in Nebraska), with fixed
rather than variable legislative terms. (Compare this with the
English Westminster model and also the French model, where
the President may call for special legislative elections.)
• Fourth, a legislative lower house composed entirely of
representatives from equally populous single-member districts,
each of which picks its representative via majority or plurality
rule. Geographic districts are regularly redrawn to maintain
equal population. No at-large representatives exist that would
ensure that the number of legislative seats held by a political
party tracks the overall percentage of party votes across the
entire jurisdiction. (Compare this with Germany, Israel, and
Italy.) The legislature is dominated by two main political
parties-the same two parties across the continent, with minor
variations. (Compare this with multi-party regimes in most
other countries.)
• Fifth, a strong "presidential" system consisting of a one-person
executive head elected independently of legislature, at fixed
terms, wielding powers of pardon, appointment, and veto
(capable of being overridden). (Compare this with
parliamentary models abroad. Even some strong presidential
systems abroad do not give the president a formal veto, for
example, in France.)
• Sixth, an executive understudy (Vice PresidentJLieutenant
Governor) explicitly provided for in the constitution, though
with few important powers of his/her own. This understudy
usually has a fixed term of office coextensive with the chief,
and is not simply able to be appointed and removed by the
chief. Rather, the understudy is typically elected by the people
at the same time they elect the chief executive. (Compare this
with the parliamentary models abroad and note that even
presidential systems abroad do not always have American-style
vice presidents--<:onsider Russia, for example.)
• Seventh, a universal understanding that the constitution is
judicially-enforceable law, unable to be invoked in ordinary
courtrooms, even between two private litigants, without the
government formally being a party. (Compare this with modem
European "Constitutional Court" systems in which
constitutional issues are often treated differently from ordinary
legal questions arising in ordinary private litigation.)
279
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• Eighth, a system blending judicial independence and
accountability in a distinctive way. Although judges, once
chosen, may not simply be fired at will by the executive or the
legislature, the process of selecting and promoting judges is
highly political. Judges do not generally appoint other judges,
nor is promotion to a higher court based strictly on seniority or
on one's reputation among fellow judges. (Compare this with,
for example, German and French systems in which the
judiciary is much more self-regulating and closer to a
bureaucratic civil service.)
• Ninth, a common-law style of adjudication featuring judicial
precedent as an important source of law. (Compare this with
continental systems as in France.)
• Tenth, juries, which comprise a prominent feature of both civil
and criminal litigation. (Compare this with continental systems
as in France.)
What follows from this pattern? There is not any strong claim that
every state must slavishly adhere to this basic American model in every
respect as a matter of federal constitutional law. It would be silly, for
example, to think that Nebraska is under any constitutional obligation to
repudiate its unicameral tradition. But in a less rigidly legal and more
sociological sense, this basic American model defines the boundaries of
realistic constitutional reform in America. Variation within the basic
American model described above are much more likely to be taken
seriously than amendment proposals outside this model, which are apt to be
viewed as "foreign," "alien," or "un-American.,,13 More specifically,
proposals to amend the federal Constitution are far more likely to be taken
seriously if comparable proposals have already been adopted and shown
their worth at the state level. In fact, most of the federal amendments that
have thus far succeeded were copycats or adaptations of pre-existing state
constitutional texts or practices.
And within the Basic Model described above-indeed, amazingly
enough, within each of the ten observed similarities across American
Constitutions-there are important variations between the federal
Constitution on the one hand, and certain widespread state practices on the
13. Examples of "alien" concepts might include variable-as opposed to fixed-terms
of office for legislature and chief executive; multi-party regimes; cumulative voting or other
proportional-representation systems for anything other than local elections; multi-member
districts for a state-wide or national legislature; parliamentary systems of legislative
selection of executive officers; and civil service models of self-appointing and self-
perpetuating judiciaries.
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other. Let us, then, revisit our ten basic elements, note the interesting
variation between state and federal constitutionalism, and ask ourselves
several questions as to each element: Should states change to fit the federal
model more closely? Or should the federal Constitution instead be
amended to fit the contrary state practice? Or might there be reasons why
the two levels of American constitutions should differ? .
• First, written state constitutions are typically much longer, and
more clearly amendable by direct popular action (initiative or
referendum) than their federal counterpart.
Law-reform questions: Are state constitutions too easy to
amend by direct popular action; or is the federal Constitution
too hard to amend? Consider the argument that a system of
majoritarian state amendment and super-majoritarian federal
amendment is "just right," as Goldilocks might say. Precisely
because the federal Constitution sets the basic ground rules that
states cannot violate, state amendments are already constrained
by a stable framework of fundamental freedom, and frequent
state amendment is not as great a threat to liberty--especially
given that it is easier for state dissenters to move to a sister
state than for national dissenters to move to a foreign country.
• Second, state constitutions are conventionally viewed as having
more explicit "positive" and "social" rights, such as the right to
education.
Law-reform questions: Should the federal Constitution be
construed to protect more "positive" rights? Or has state
experience shown that courts (and other governmental
enforcers) do a rather bad job of protecting such rights?
• Third, many states have term limits for legislature and also
allow voters to "recall" elected officials (making individual
state legislators' terms slightly less fixed, formally). Many
states also have ways of passing ordinary statutes that supplant
or supplement legislature, including initiative and referendum.
Law-reform questions: Should states abandon term limits for
state legislators, or should the federal Constitution be amended
to provide for term limits? If so, how could members of
Congress ever be induced to sUfPort such a Congress-limiting
amendment under Article V?) Note also how the current
asymmetry between state and federal lawmakers might give
14. See discussion ofChapt. II supra § I.
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Congress various "repeat player" advantages in the state-
federal tug of war, and also a stronger position vis it vis a
powerful president. On one view, because the president is so
much stronger than state governors, we need a more
experienced group of legislators to counterbalance him than is
needed at the state level. Thus, one argument for status quo
might be that it leads to a strong federal government that is not
overly tilted towards the president.
• Fourth, under the Supreme Court's case law, no
malapportionment of the upper house of state legislatures (i.e.,
one count~, one vote) akin to that of the U.S. Senate is
permitted. 5 See Reynolds v. Sims (1964).
Law-reform questions: If the deep principle ofReynolds v. Sims
is right, and state upper houses may not be malapportioned by
giving unequally populated counties equal seats, is the basic
apportionment principle of the U.S. Senate a vicious one? Or,
once again, is federalism somehow the answer? Some would
say yes, federalism is the answer, and counties are not the same
as states in an inherently federal system. The better view is
that giving Nevada and California equal representation may
benefit some political interest groups (at the expense of other
groups), but does little to protect states qua states. So perhaps
the federal Constitution should be changed to reduce Senate-
malapportionment-say, by giving each state at least one
senator and capping even the largest state at eight senators. But
could small states ever be induced to agree to a federal
amendment?16
• Fifth, each state chief executive is elected by direct popular
vote rather than by something akin to federal electoral college.
Some state governors are subject to popular recall. State
governors have no strong foreign affairs powers. Most
important, virtually no state has a strongly "unitary" executive.
Almost all states, for example, have an attorney general elected
separately from the governor rather than appointed by him.
Many states feature a wide variety of "cabinet" positions
elected by the people rather than hand-picked (and removable)
by the governor. In these respects, state governors seem much
weaker than the president. On the other hand, state governors
are often empowered to exercise a "line item veto."
15. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
16. For a discussion on how small states might be induced, see discussion on Chapt. 11
supra § 1.
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Law-refonn questions: If the federal Electoral College is so
good, why does no state (or foreign country, for that matter)
follow it? 17 Here, examination of state constitutions helps us
see with distinctive clarity a good candidate for federal
constitutional refonn. Note that originally, the Electoral
College did indeed sound in federalism concern-but none of
these concerns seem apt today. Also, can state experience with
line-item veto infonn federal debate? Perhaps one argument
for current difference is that the president is already so much
more powerful than state governors that yet another arrow in
his quiver would be threatening to liberty. But does this really
ring true? Finally, even if (for reasons explained earlier in the
discussion of Chapter 4) the 1978 federal independent counsel
statute was plainly unconstitutional, should we fonnally amend
the federal Constitution to permit such a device, which has
worked well at the state level? 18 If we do so, should we adopt
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17. Actually, Mississippi has a variant of the electoral college: unless a gubernatorial
candidate wins both a statewide popular majority and a majority of legislative districts, the
race is decided by the state legislature. But this system, designed in 1890, was conceived in
sin-designed to prevent a Black candidate from ever winning the governership. And in
fact, a close look at the federal electoral college shows that its roots also lie in political
racism, enabling states like Virginia to disenfranchise Blacks without penalty in presidential
elections.
18. Although the federal independent counsel statute ill fit the architecture of the
federal Constitution, it initially seemed not "foreign," but natural, because it resembled
schemes that had worked in various state constitutions that seemed at first almost identical
to the federal model. In fact, however, these constitutions are different in key respects, and
so piecemeal borrowing here was a big mistake. As I explained in The New Republic in
October, 1999:
It is not particularly surprising that [Janet] Reno came to town supporting the
independent counsel statute; when she assumed office, she had relatively little
understanding of the how things work in Washington. Coming from Florida, she
had seen independent counsel regimes work rather well. But in Florida-and
virtually every other state-the executive branch is not designed to be unitary;
attorney generals are constitutionally separate from governors. At the federal
level, however, the attorney general serves at the pleasure of the president, in
whom all executive power is vested; a wholly independent prosecutor doesn't fit
into this template.
State law enforcement rarely affects international relations, whereas federal law
enforcement more routinely touches upon foreign affairs. For example, the plight
of American hostages in the middle east (the Oliver North case), the status of
Puerto Rico under international law (the F.A.L.N. case), and the gravity of
espionage on behalf of Israel (the Jonathan Pollard case) are issues that fall
squarely in the president's portfolio. Independent investigations wholly
inattentive to the president's foreign policy goals and duties are constitutionally
awkward. Only after several years in the job did Reno begin to grasp that,
constitutionally, she wasn't in Florida anymore-that a system that might work in
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special rules about investigations that affect foreign policy? Or
instead, should we try to develop infonnal traditions of
independence within the Justice Department?
• Sixth, many states allow voters to vote separately for governor
and lieutenant governor, but at the federal level, voters have
generally been denied the option to split their ticket by voting
for Party A for president and Party B for vice president. An
interesting wrinkle is that in some states, when governor leaves
the jurisdiction, his or her powers devolve upon the lieutenant
until he or she returns.
Law-refonn questions: Is the current federal practice of
selecting a vice president as a mere adjunct to the president-
without allowing ticket-splitting-a sensible way of conferring
legitimacy on the person who, if tragedy strikes, may need to
be the national leader? Conversely, should state rules
conferring power on the lieutenant governor whenever the
governor leaves the state be abandoned as creating needless
mischief? The lack of a federal counterpart (combined with the
fact that this rule does not exist in all state constitutions) might
suggest that this rule is of doubtful utility.
• Seventh, many state supreme courts can issue "advisory"
opinions directly to the legislature before a law is passed or a
private lawsuit crystallizes; the u.s. Supreme Court cannot.
Law-refonn questions: Should federal courts be allowed to
render anticipatory opinions, before a proposed law has been
adopted by legislature? Doesn't state experience show that
these opinions are sometimes useful and rarely hannful?
Would the federal Constitution need to be amended here, or
just reinterpreted to offer a less sweeping reading of early court
decisions like the Correspondence of the Justices with
President Washington?
• Eighth, state judges typically lack life tenure, and many are
subject to being voted on (at time of appointment, or later in a
retention context) by the general electorate, sometimes in a
contested election featuring full-blown media campaigns and
explicit party endorsements.
Law-refonn questions: Do federal judges enjoy too much
individual states cannot work for the nation.
Akhil Reed Amar, Scandalized, THE NEW REpUBLIC, Oct. II, 1999, at 16.
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independence? Do state judges enjoy too little? Here it seems
that both are true-that the best model would be one that gave
judges more than most states (sparing them popular election
and retention), but less than the federal Constitution (with, say,
a fixed fifteen year nonrenewable term, or mandatory
retirement at age seventy rather than life tenure).
• Ninth, state court precedents misconstruing state constitutions
are easier to overturn by state constitutional amendments. (See
point one, above.)
Law-reform question: Shouldn't the U.S. Supreme Court be
especially open to reconsider its own previous constitutional
rulings that are alleged to be in error, given the special
difficulty of correcting misrulings by federal amendments?
• Tenth, many states have done away with grand juries, and a
few have moved away from a unanimity requirement in
criminal cases.
Law-reform questions: Why shouldn't states be required to use
grand juries, just as they are required to honor virtually all the
other guarantees of the Bill of Rights via the Fourteenth
Amendment? If the argument is that the grand jury has truly
out-lived its usefulness, then perhaps the Constitution should
be amended to relieve the federal government of this
"nuisance." The status quo--grand juries for federal crimes
but not for state crimes-seems rather hard to justify. Also,
perhaps state experiment with non-unanimous criminal juries
should be emulated by the federal government. Note that voting
rules need not be symmetric: perhaps it should take only a
simple majority (or less) to acquit. (Currently, unless all
federal jurors vote to acquit, the jury is hung, and retrial is
permissible.) But perhaps a very strong supermajority (say, ten
of twelve) should be required to convict. (Note that in
impeachment, it takes two-thirds to convict, but anything short
of this counts as an acquittal.)
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III. CONTINUING THE INTERDISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION
The preceding book overview and chapter outline were composed
shortly after I learned the names of the other contributions to today's book
symposium. What follows are a few connections between my book projects
and the distinctive contributions that have been made over the years by my
symposium colleagues.
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First, as with my last book, my next book aims, ambitiously, to cover
a vast amount of ground and to do so in a way that is scholarly and yet
accessible to general interest readers-say, a high school student in
Advanced Placement History or Advanced Placement Government, or a
high school teacher of such a course. This ambition might not seem
particularly remarkable to leading scholars in history and in political
science. Indeed, all the professors in today's symposium have written
grand books with comparable ambition. But for those of us who teach
primarily or exclusively in law schools, there are rather fewer models to
emulate. Many of the twentieth century's most distinguished constitutional
scholars in law schools concentrated on articles and teaching materials
written for lawyers, judges, law professors, and law students-not books
aimed at general readers. (Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler spring to
mind.) Perhaps the most epic achievement by a law professor in the last
century was Laurence Tribe's towering treatise-but this, too, was aimed at
those within the legal profession and not beyond it. 19
Still, there were several models of books about law-books with a
distinctively legal focus, books that actually analyzed legal questions from
a legal point of view with excellent legal analysis-that also managed to
engage a much broader, non-professional audience. Kermit Hall wrote
books like this. Les Benedict writes books like this. While it is true that
both Hall and Benedict got most of their training in history departments
rather than in law schools, both did stints as professors of law as well as of
history. Thus, their work has given me useful templates for the sort of
interdisciplinary work that I have aspired to do-work that seeks to engage
law as lawyers, law students, and judges understand law, but work that also
tries to speak to those outside the profession.2o
A second theme evident in both my last book and my next one is
federalism, with particular emphasis on the significance of state
constitutions. Here, too, I have found inspiration from the life work of
many of the members of today's symposium-especially Professors Lutz,
Rossum, and Benedict. Professor Lutz has powerfully demonstrated that
no account of the federal Bill of Rights can ignore its state constitutional
antecedents. In my last book, I tried to show how a similar point could be
19. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
20. I cannot resist mentioning one other towering role model for me in this regard-
Syracuse's own Professor William Wiecek, who earned an LL.B. in law as well as a Ph.D.
in history and who has taught in both law schools and history departments. Though not an
official member of today's symposium, Professor Wiecek's gentle spirit hovers over it, and
I should like to take this special opportunity to salute him for a lifetime of extraordinary
work in legal history. He has been a true inspiration for me.
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made about the entire federal Constitution of 1787-88; and in my next
book--especially in chapter ten-I hope to demonstrate the ongoing
relevance of state constitutions even after the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
Professor Rossum has written an engaging account of the federalism
dimensions of the Senate, both as originally conceived, and as that
institution evolved as a result of informal election practices and, later, the
Seventeenth Amendment. And much of Professor Benedict's work has
illuminated the complex issues of federalism that arose in the aftermath of
the Civil War.
Which brings me to a third theme. My work in both books aims to
focus not merely on the Founding, but on the subsequent two hundred years
of American constitutionalism, with special emphasis on the
Reconstruction. On Reconstruction in particular, lowe an enormous debt
to Les Benedict (and also to William Wiecek). More generally, I have
benefited greatly from Rogers Smith's epic work, Civic Ideals: Conflicting
Visions ofCitizenship in Us. History.21 The broad chronological sweep of
Smith's work-ranging far beyond the Founding period-stands in sharp
contrast to much of the more narrowly time-framed (and Founding-
obsessed) work by other leading scholars. Like Smith, I believe we must
understand the Founding and also get past it in order to have an adequate
account of our constitutional present and a sense of what is realistically
imaginable for our foreseeable constitutional future. Professor Lutz has
also written very interestingly on the amendment process over time. With
my focus on formal amendments and informal ways of effecting
constitutional change, I see myself following in Lutz's footsteps.
A final point worth mentioning is that even in a book about unwritten
constitutionalism, I shall aim to offer an account in which the written
Constitution is not ignored or swallowed up. Unwritten constitutionalism
needs to connect to written constitutionalism in certain ways-or so I shall
argue. Here, I am particularly heartened by the work of Ralph Rossum,
given his special interest in textualism, originalism, and more general
issues of interpretive methodology in constitutional law. Many political
scientists-and many historians, for that matter-have a tendency to be
somewhat dismissive of such legal issues. Professor Rossum's work stands
as a powerful, and to my mind, an admirable antidote. Come to think of it,
so does the work of virtually every member oftoday's symposium.
21. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY (1997).
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